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The Power of Double Coding to Represent New Forms of Representation: *The Truman Show*, *Dorian Gray*, "Blow-Up," and Whistler's *Caprice in Purple and Gold*

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Abstract Doubly coded artworks—artworks that are embedded in other artworks—sometimes represent an art form (a medium, a genre) that at the time they are made cannot be represented except through double coding. The phenomenon is rare and occurs only when several conditions are met. First, in the doubly coded (embedded) section, the subordination of one voice to the other voice is so extreme that the section can be likened to a duet sung by one voice. This hierarchical relation in which the materiality of the representation is fully controlled by the embedding voice permits a filmmaker or visual artist or fiction writer to speak or embody a world-making voice other than her or his own. The final requirement for double coding to enable representation of a new art form is the imaginative leap of a perceiver, who interprets the artwork in the fictional world (the artwork made by the fictional world-making voice) as an example of a new art form potentially capable of independent existence in our world.

In an interview in the *New York Times* published shortly before the release of *The Truman Show* on 5 June 1998, the director, Peter Weir, when asked why

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he had chosen to make the movie, responded that the script had "haunted him for several weeks." He "kept thinking," he said, "'How do I do this?' . . . It was like trying to pick up a hedgehog. . . . It's not your regular movie. To some degree, the film subverts the movie form itself" (Weinraub 1998). If Andrew Niccol's brilliant script subverts the movie form, I propose in this essay, it does so by embedding within the movie a new television genre: a real-time televised representation of a life that is on the air twenty-four hours every day, a genre that cannot at present be represented except through double coding. I adopt the term "double coding" from Yury Lotman (1994 [1981]: 381), who observes that even in "the simplest occurrence" of a text within a text—he gives as examples "a painting within a painting, a play within a play, a film within a film, and a novel within a novel"—"the included section is encoded in the same way as the remaining text and thus is doubly coded."[1] I am using Lotman's term "doubly coded" to denote a painting within a painting but, also, a painting within a novel and a television show within a film. My thesis is that double coding can enable representation of new forms of representation (art forms, genres, media) that at a given time cannot be represented except through the power of double coding.[2]

I begin this essay by analyzing the relations between the embedded and the embedding sections in *The Truman Show*, then broaden my scope to include two additional examples of doubly coded forms that enable representation of art forms that cannot otherwise be represented. In the second section I consider, from a theoretical perspective, the relationship between voices and media in double coding and identify, in doubly coded forms that represent new forms, a pattern of subordination of voice to voice that I adopt Marie-Laure Ryan's term "window" to name. Then in the third section I add one more example and revisit my other examples to examine the

1. The architect Charles Jencks (1987: 33–34 and 57 n. 8) uses the term "doubly coded" to describe a quite different phenomenon. Jencks introduced the term in 1975 to draw attention to the hybridity of postmodern architecture: a doubly coded building incorporates both modern and traditional elements and appeals to both elite and popular tastes. In Lotman's usage, in contrast, the term describes an artwork that embedding guides perceivers to conceive as doubly represented. My usage in this essay follows Lotman's.

2. Modern studies of forms in which one expression is contained within, or embedded within, or represented through another expression generally trace their origin to André Gide's description, in his *Journal* for 1893, of the form that has come to be known as *mise en abyme* or interior duplication. The form Gide describes is a category of double coding in which the embedded expression mirrors or duplicates the embedding expression. Although my topic is a different category of double coding—one in which the embedded expression cannot be represented except through double coding—I acknowledge the influence of studies on the mise en abyme, particularly those by Bruce Morrissette (1971), Jean Ricardou (1967), and Lucien Dällenbach (1989 [1977]).

traces of mediation through which semiotic systems in several media indicate the subordinating effect of voice on voice. In a concluding section I return to the question of temporal relations between the embedded artwork and the doubly coded form that represents it, this time locating the power of double coding to represent new forms of representation primarily in the process of perception.

1.

The movie *The Truman Show* embeds a fictional television program called *The Truman Show*, which has been on the air without interruption, twenty-four hours a day, for nearly thirty years since Truman's birth. Truman is the star, but he does not know that his life is being filmed and broadcast to the world. In the movie, Truman discovers that he is a character in a television program and escapes to the world that embeds the show. The movie audience sees representations of both worlds, the television show and the world in which it is produced, where Christof, the "creator" of the show, and his narratees, the television audience, live.

According to information given in the movie, the televised *The Truman Show* represents Truman's life visually even in situations where visual representation is customarily elided in network television and in films for general audiences. Viewers of the movie are told, for instance, that Truman's birth was broadcast live on television. But while the movie shows prebirth images of a fetal Truman swimming in utero, and an image of a blanket-swaddled Truman in a hospital's newborn nursery, neither the birth nor subsequent feeding, diaper changing, or bathing is represented visually in the film.

On June 16, 1998, less than two weeks after *The Truman Show* opened in New York on June 5, the birth of a child was broadcast on the Internet. This historical event initially drew my attention to the suppression in the movie of visual representation of Truman's birth.[3] This and other events, in conjunction with an apparently insatiable interest in reality-based television among producers and viewers, suggest that expectations of financial success, perhaps tempered by legal and ethical issues about filming people without their consent, will weigh more heavily in determining whether we

3. Although film often offers complementary and even contradictory information through two (or more) of the medium's available channels of communication, my interest in the gap between the description and the visual representation of the televised *The Truman Show* was instigated by Gerald Prince's (1988: 2) pathbreaking study of the "disnarrated" in narratives reported in words: "all the events that *do not* happen but, nonetheless, are referred to (in a negative or hypothetical mode) by the narrative text" (Prince's italics) and David Herman's (1994) analysis of hypothetical focalization. See also Brian Richardson's (2001) recent work on "denarration."

will soon see an equivalent to the televised *The Truman Show* than concerns about the transgressive nature of the camera. In addition to reflecting societal views, however, the distinction between which elements of the television show are represented visually and which are summarized provides a means to investigate the borders between the movie and the embedded representation of the television show.

Visually, these borders are often indistinguishable. Until the transmission of the television program is cut off near the end of the movie, any scenic representation of Truman may be perceived as a scene in the movie or as a representation of a scene from the television program. Scenes from the television show that are represented in the movie, and scenic representations in the movie of Truman's life *look* exactly alike; often viewers have no visual cues to help them decide whether they are watching a segment of the embedded television show or a scenic passage in the film. Under these circumstances, viewers can distinguish between representations of the television show and the movie that embeds it not by the appearance of the scene but only by the relations between the scene and contiguous segments: that is, the shape of the narrative that is unfolding. Let me explain.

The screenplay subverts movie form by permitting first-time viewers of the movie to assume that they are seeing what they would see if they were watching, not the television show from its beginnings, at the time of Truman's birth, but the television show as they would see it if they lived in Christof's world and tuned their television sets to the channel where *The Truman Show* was playing day 10,909. First-time viewers, I suggest, are given several reasons to think they are seeing a representation of the television show. First, the opening moments include indications that suggest television rather than film. The movie begins with a pattern of identifying information familiar to television viewers, who see similar scenes at the beginning of each episode in a series. Credits roll across the screen to identify the television show's "conceiver and creator" Christof and its stars: Truman himself, and the two characters in the movie who play on television his "wife" and "best friend." In Truman's stylized greeting to the world, when he walks out of his house, viewers recognize the comic exaggeration of an opening gesture, designed to hold viewers' interest until the action of the episode begins.

Second, although the movie alternates between scenes showing the television world and scenes showing the world that contains it, it begins with the former. Thus viewers familiarize themselves with that world first. This strategy permits viewers to see the television world initially more or less from Truman's perspective, as the place he calls home, and only then—but still before Truman does—to see the world that contains Truman's home,

where Christof makes decisions about Truman's life. This sequence guides viewers to adopt Truman's interpretation of his situation and care about his efforts to change it, but it also supports viewers' initial assumption that they are seeing a representation of a segment of the televised *The Truman Show*.

Third, the movie also relies on interpretations developed through television viewing about the nature of the sign in film. The medium of film, whether television or movie, heightens the customary difference between scene and summary in verbal narratives, by depicting scenes visually as well as through words. Following the conventional usage in media studies of the set of terms introduced by C. S. Pierce, film, like photography, is iconic; it resembles its referent. Unlike other forms of visual representation, moreover, photography and film are indexical; they attest to the materiality of the referent. This is one of the distinctive aspects of the medium of film, as Roland Barthes (1981 [1980]: 76–77) discerns in *Camera Lucida*: "Photography's Referent is not the same as the referent of other systems of representation. . . . [T]he genius of Photography [is to] compel [us] to believe its referent ha[s] really existed."[4]

Where television is most clearly differentiated from cinema is exactly at those moments when it is absolutely indexical—in real-time representations of real events in our world: ball games in progress, live interviews, happenings in the news or disasters that are given live coverage.[5] The televised *The Truman Show* is described in the film as a real-time representation of a real event, broadcast in a medium that is capable of real-time representation of real events. Viewers' knowledge that real-time representation is available to television but not to cinema supports the announcement at the beginning of the movie that we are watching a television show and encourages us to interpret the opening segment of the film as a representation of the television show. The genius of *The Truman Show*'s script is that it combines the idea that the televised representation of Truman's life is a fully indexical real-time representation of a real life with the idea that the movie we are watching permits us to glimpse this extraordinary new television genre.

4. But as Ellen Seiter (1992: 36) warns, although "most images produced by cameras belong to Pierce's class of 'indexical signs' because they require the physical presence of the referent before the camera lens at some point in time for their production . . . [t]his fact about an image is, however, virtually impossible to verify without being present at the time the image was made. Stand-ins and look-alikes, trick photographs, special effects, computer-generated graphics, multiple exposures, and animated images can all be used to lie to the camera."

5. Sarah Kozloff (1992: 89) defines "'liveness' . . . as the apparent congruence between discourse-time and reception-time—that is, no time gap exists between the narrative's production and its consumption." Marie-Laure Ryan (1993) offers a compelling analysis of the live broadcast of baseball games as real-time narrative.

For movie viewers, I am suggesting, this concept is sufficiently fascinating that, at least on first viewing, we may choose to overlook the initial strong cue, some twelve minutes into the film, that we are not watching a representation of a real-time television program but a movie. The screen depicts the adult Truman looking out at the sea, followed by a scene in which a much younger Truman watches his father drown. In a movie, this shift to a younger Truman is an easily explained visualization of Truman's memory. In a real-time camera's-eye representation of Truman's life, a shift to a visualized past cannot occur because Truman's memories are unavailable to the camera.

Even more obviously cinematic in shape is the scene that begins some twenty minutes into the film, when Truman goes to his basement and removes a woman's sweater from a trunk where he has kept it. In a long eight-minute flashback that concludes when the camera returns to the adult Truman holding the sweater, we see decisive scenes from Truman's high-school years: an incipient flirtation with the woman Sylvia, whose sweater he holds; Truman's first meeting with Meryl, whom he will marry; and the forcible removal of Sylvia—from Truman's arms, and from the show—by a man who claims to be her father and says he is going to take her with him to Fiji.

If the televised *The Truman Show* "is on 24 hours a day" and is "broadcast live and unedited, every day, seven days a week," as the movie tells us it is, then we must conceive the television show as having the following characteristics (according to the parameters established by Gérard Genette): (1) Truman's life will be represented chronologically, (2) the duration of the representation will in every instance be equivalent to the duration of the event—that is, every event will receive full scenic treatment, and (3) the ratio of the frequency of the representation to the frequency with which events occur will be one-to-one.[6] If Truman says good morning every morning, the show will represent him saying good morning every morning. If Truman watches his father drown once, the show will represent once—and only once—Truman's watching his father drown, and the scene will occur in the representation in the same position in the sequence as it occurs in the chronology of Truman's life.

Drawing attention to the effect of flashbacks, Seymour Chatman (1978: 67) observes that "expositon is a function rather than a subclass of analepsis." According to Meir Sternberg's (1978: 21) definition, the exposition

6. In the portion of *Figures III* by Gérard Genette that is published in English under the title *Narrative Discourse*, the first three chapters are titled "Order," "Duration," and "Frequency." As Genette (1980: 32 n. 13) points out, "these three [but not the fourth, "Mood," or the fifth, "Voice"] deal with time."

of a narrative includes the events that in a reconstructed chronological sequence precede the first event that receives full scenic treatment—that is, the first event where "representational time [corresponds to] the clock-marked time we employ in everyday life." Sternberg's important study explores the effects of the placement of expositional material. I am proposing that the existence of expositional material is the clearest distinguishing feature between the movie *The Truman Show* and the television show it embeds.

The televised *The Truman Show*, as we are led to conceive it, has broadcast a fully scenic, clock-time representation of Truman's life since Truman's life began. There *is* no material that chronologically precedes the first scenically treated event. In the television show, there is no exposition. In the movie, on the other hand, the first event that receives full scenic treatment is Truman's departure from his house on the morning of day 10,909. The previous 10,908 days of Truman's life comprise the expositional time span. Events of this period are revealed in the movie through flashbacks and summaries.

As a result, until the transmission of the television program is cut off near the end of the movie, whenever viewers see a scenic representation of Truman's life, we cannot distinguish visually between scenes from the movie and scenes from the television show. Only the shape of the narrative as it unfolds, determined by the placement of the expositional material, permits us finally to ascertain that the movie we are of course viewing has succeeded extremely well in permitting us to glimpse a new television genre not yet available for us to experience except through double coding.

Nor is *The Truman Show* the first instance in which double coding enables representation of a previously unavailable form. Famously, in Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891), Dorian retains his youthful beauty while his portrait ages. In the novel, the representation of the embedded image through ekphrasis—the verbal representation of a visually depicted scene—permits representation of a medium otherwise unavailable in 1891, when the novel was published: the moving image that we now call film.

In contrast, in Julio Cortázar's story "Las babas del diablo," published in 1959 and known in English as "Blow-Up," the embedding of a photograph in a story serves a purpose that cinema cannot. In the story a photographer enlarges a photograph he has taken, hangs it on the wall in his apartment, and then watches the representations of the people he has photographed leave the photograph; occasionally thereafter he sees a cloud float across the photographed scene. Because the photographer's interaction with elements within the embedded photograph is represented through ekphrasis rather

than a visual depiction, whether the border between the photographer's world and the world of the photograph is permeable, or whether the photographer's focalization is untrustworthy, is ambiguous. If the story were filmed, the indexical nature of the photographic sign would remove this ambiguity by attesting to the existence either of a photograph that changes in response to events in the world that contains it or of a photograph that, like all those we know, represents an unchanging image.

In fact, in Michelangelo Antonioni's movie *Blow-Up* (1966), which was inspired by Cortázar's story, the photographer makes enlargements of various sizes and studies them to see if the larger format reveals something he has not previously seen. But in the film the photographs remain still photographs, not an extraordinary new art form that can be represented only if embedded in another form. Moreover in the film, in the scene in which the photographer studies the photographs, viewers are permitted to see the photographs. If one thinks of the narration in the film as having been turned over to the photographer in this scene, then the photographs offer viewers a simultaneous independent perspective that is not available to Cortázar's readers, who cannot see the photograph in the story.[7] If in the story the figures do in fact escape from the photograph hanging in the photographer's apartment, we will probably not see a photograph with these characteristics in the foreseeable future except through the power of double coding.

2.

Moving now to consider from a theoretical perspective the circumstances in which double coding can enable representation of new forms, I turn first to Marie-Laure Ryan's ideas about boundaries within narratives, which are fundamental to my understanding of the effects of double coding. Ryan (1990: 873) distinguishes between two types of boundaries: "boundaries within the representing discourse," which she terms "illocutionary" boundaries, and "boundaries within the represented reality (the 'semantic domain' of the text)," or ontological boundaries. Although the thematics of *The Truman Show*, like Wilde's novel and Cortázar's story, includes the crossing of ontological boundaries by characters, and the resultant subversion of ontological boundaries between represented worlds, my focus in this essay is on illocutionary rather than ontological boundaries. Illocutionary boundaries—within the representing discourse—are the ones that establish a text

7. In film, as André Gaudreault (1993: 269–70) discerns, the substitution of one narrator for another is generally less complete than in a narrative told in a natural language because of the additional channels that film offers through which information can be transmitted.

within a text, a play within a play, and so forth.[8] In doubly coded forms in which the medium is a natural language, "illocutionary boundaries mediate between speech acts, and they signal changes in narrative voice" (ibid.: 874). If we define "speech act" to include expression in any medium—for example, a painting, a photograph, a television show, a film—we can say that all doubly coded forms offer a representation (a semblance) of the speech act of two voices.

But doubly coded forms consist of three elements, not two. In doubly coded forms that combine more than one medium, the possibility of differentiating elements according to medium facilitates discerning (1) an "external" element, (2) an "embedded" element, and (3) an "embedding" element. In Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1902), for instance, (1) the account that Marlow presents to his friends orally is (2) represented in the novel in written English in (3) an embedding narrative in written English. In Mario Vargas Llosa's *Elogia de la madrasta* (1988, translated in 1990 as *In Praise of the Stepmother*), (1) paintings by Titian, Fra Angelico, Francis Bacon, and others—oil paintings that hang in museums—are (2) represented in the novel through color photographs in (3) an embedding narrative in written Spanish that includes fantasies, dreams, and perhaps actions that mirror the scenes in the paintings.[9]

As these two examples demonstrate, the ontological status of the *external* element varies widely. The oil paintings that are represented in Vargas Llosa's novel hang in museums in our world, while Marlow's oral account occurs nowhere else than in the narrative world that readers of Conrad's novel (re)construct. There is one attribute of the external element, however, that does not vary: the external element is not *in* the doubly coded representation. There is no oil paint in Vargas Llosa's novel and no sound of Marlow's spoken words in Conrad's novel.

The significance of identifying an external element that is not in a doubly coded representation is that the external element is the speech act of the

8. The crossing of an ontological boundary, in contrast, is exemplified for Ryan (1990: 874) by *Alice in Wonderland*: "the text moves from the primary reality of an everyday world, to the dream world of Wonderland, and back to the primary reality in a continuous speech act." One world is embedded in another, but not a text in a text. Ryan describes and offers examples of three categories of narratives with boundaries: those with only an illocutionary boundary, or only an ontological boundary, or both ontological and illocutionary boundaries; and for each category, the crossing may be actual or virtual (ibid.: 874–75).

9. Tamar Yacobi (1997: 36) perceives that ekphrasis, where re-presentation is by definition in a new medium, "[l]ike all 'quotation' . . . bundles together no less than three, rather than two, domains: one first-order, strictly 'represented'; one second-order, 'representational' in the visual mode; one third-order, 're-presentational' in the linguistic discourse." *All* embedded forms, in whatever medium or combination of media, are tripartite.

external voice. In *Heart of Darkness*, the external voice is that of Marlow, whose speech act is the oral account he gives to his friends. In Vargas Llosa's novel, the external voice (in this case, a plural voice) is that of the painters; their speech acts are the oil-on-canvas depictions that hang in museums. I have chosen the term *external* to emphasize that the speech act of the external voice is not in the doubly coded representation. Two voices are represented in doubly coded forms, but the external voice cannot be heard independently.

The *embedding* element is the speech act of the embedding voice: that of the narrator in the two novels I am using as examples of relatively conventional doubly coded forms. In the embedding section of Conrad's novel, the narrator provides information about Marlow and describes the scene in which Marlow tells his tale. In the embedding section of Vargas Llosa's novel, the narrator recounts events in the narrative world that mirror those depicted in the paintings.

The *embedded* element in Conrad's novel is the textual transcription of Marlow's spoken words, and in Vargas Llosa's novel it is the photographs of the paintings. Like Lotman, I see double coding—the phenomenon that gives its name to the doubly coded form—as an attribute of the embedded section (Lotman's "included section"), but I use the term to emphasize an aspect of the form that conceiving it as tripartite, rather than duple, permits. In the passage that I cited at the beginning of this essay, Lotman (1994 [1981]: 381) explains that even when the medium of the embedded and the embedding sections are the same (e.g., a painting within a painting), "the included section is . . . doubly coded." As I understand this statement, Lotman is using the term *doubly coded* to draw attention to the (unquestionably considerable) effects of the embedding voice on interpretations of the external voice's speech act. Because I conceive the form as tripartite, I can distinguish between the effects of the embedding voice in the embedding section (where only the embedding voice speaks) and the effects of the embedding voice in the embedded section (where the embedding voice and the external voice intermingle). I use the term *double coding* to emphasize the commingling of the two voices in the embedded section. The story that Conrad's Marlow tells is encoded in the oral language he speaks *and* in the written language in the novel. The paintings "in" Vargas Llosa's novel are encoded first as oil paintings and then as photographs. The embedded section of a doubly coded form represents the external voice and the embedding voice speaking together.

A characteristic of all doubly coded forms is that, although the external voice can be conceived as independent, it cannot be heard independently from the embedding voice. In embedding sections, sometimes the external

voice and sometimes the embedding voice dominates. Relations between the two voices can vary along a continuum of possibilities. When an external speech act is placed in its entirety in an embedding section (e.g., a complete painting or an entire matchbook is glued onto a collage), the external voice is dominant and the role of the embedding voice in the embedded section is limited to selection and positioning. We might place Vargas Llosa's novel near this end of the continuum, even though the painters' paintings are represented through photographs. The narrator transfers the external voices' speech acts from one visual medium to another (paintings to photographs), but otherwise his role in the embedded section is limited to selecting these rather than other paintings and choosing their placements.[10] At the other end of the continuum—in cases of ekphrasis, filming a novel, summarizing a film, describing a symphony, where the embedding voice transfers the medium of an external voice's speech act across visual-to-verbal, verbal-to-visual, or musical sounds-to-verbal lines—conceptual aspects of the external voice's speech act are at best retained; the embedding voice completely determines the form of the representation. Conrad's novel provides an example between these two extremes: an embedded section in which Marlow's spoken words are transcribed (and also presumably selected) by Conrad's narrator.

Before considering the interrelation between voices in the embedded sections of the category of double coding on which I am focusing, I want to look more closely at the illocutionary boundary: the boundary that Ryan discerns between speech acts within doubly coded representations. Once we recognize that the external voice's speech act is not in the doubly coded representation, we can see that the illocutionary boundary lies between the embedding section (the speech act of the embedding voice) and the embedded section (where the external voice and the embedding voice intermingle).

Boundaries, Ryan (1990: 873) further perceives, sometimes offer "gates to get across [and sometimes merely] windows to look through." Although I adopt Ryan's metaphorical terms because they are as useful for my purposes as for her purpose of envisioning ontological and illocutionary boundaries in relation to each other, "windows" and "gates" in illocutionary boundaries are readily differentiated when the medium is language. "Gates," as she uses the term, are indicated by quotation marks; readers are permitted to perceive (at least a segment of a textual transcription of) a character's

10. In the embedding section, the narrator guides readers' interpretations of the paintings by drawing attention to some—rather than other—aspects of the visual depictions. The effect of the embedding voice's role in the embedding section on interpretations of the external voice's speech act is an issue that will be addressed later in this essay.

speech act, whether in the form of directly quoted dialogues or of stories that characters tell.[11] "Windows," in contrast, inform readers that a character's speech act occurs. In the case of "windows," according to Ryan (ibid.: 874), "the speech act of the character is presented through the speech act of the narrator, as in indirect discourse. We are informed of the storytelling act of the character, but we are denied access to his actual discourse." Doubly coded forms that enable representation of a new form of representation, I now specify, will offer (merely) a "window" to look through from the embedding section to the embedded section rather than a "gate" to go across.

The necessity of "window" over "gate" that I see is formal. I am not suggesting that quotation marks eradicate the characteristic bidirectional interplay between external and embedding voices.[12] Sternberg (1982: 133), who addresses precisely this issue, perceives that "even direct discourse" is "inherently mediated, it is inherently complicated even where no traces of mediacy show on the surface." Continuing, he provides the distinction that underlies what I see as the formal necessity of "window" over "gate": "At the very most, [direct discourse] can be said or required to show no such traces [of mediacy], *to leave the subject's expression physically (as opposed to contextually) intact*, or in other words, to make the inset a homonymic echo or transcript of the original" (ibid., my italics).

In the case of a "gate," quotation marks can be seen as encircling a physically intact (segment of a textual transcription of an) external speech act—where, within the quoted segment, there are no traces of the mediating embedding voice. Like a seam or a dotted line, quotation marks designate where to cut, to be able to remove an object that, whether it is enriched or diminished by its new context, can stand independently. Conrad's and Vargas Llosa's novels both provide examples of boundaries between embedded and embedding sections that are "gates." We can remove the quoted section in Conrad's novel and say not that it *is* Marlow's speech act but that it can stand independently as a representation of Marlow's spoken words. We can

11. Ryan (1990: 874) describes "gates" in illocutionary boundaries as follows: "On the micro-level, this case is illustrated by directly quoted dialogues. Macro-level instances include narratives of personal experience (such as a newly encountered character's telling what circumstances have led to his present situation), or 'gossip narratives' (a character's telling a story about another member of the same world to satisfy the hearer's curiosity, as in Balzac's *Sarrasine*)."

12. Lotman (1994: 378–79) describes the "far-reaching consequences" of the introduction of any "external text" into another: "The external text is transformed in the structural field of the other text's meaning and a new message is created. . . . [T]he transformation occurs not only within the entering text; the entire semiotic situation inside the other text is also changed."

remove the photographs in Vargas Llosa's novel and say not that they are the oil paintings but that they can stand independently as a representation of the oil paintings. In contrast, a new form that can be represented only through double coding cannot (by definition) stand independently.

In the case of a "window"—for which my example at the local level, following Ryan, is indirect discourse—the physical form of the speech act is altered (e.g., its signifiers: pronouns, deictic elements, verb tenses), and there are no quotation marks. Without quotation marks, the boundary between the embedded section and the embedding section is seamless; its position cannot be precisely located. Moreover, the physical changes to the external speech act undermine its independence (literally—since it is always subordinate to the principal verb and often introduced by the subordinating conjunction *that*), with the result that, even if a seam could be located along which to cut to remove it, the embedded section could not stand independently.

Also, and just as significantly, if indirect discourse is the only source of information about the external speech act to which listeners and readers have access, epistemological issues arise.[13] Within the embedded section, the physical changes that indirect discourse imposes on a reported speech act introduce an almost word-by-word ambiguity about which voice's speech each word represents: the external voice's speech act or the embedding voice's act of mediation. In indirect discourse the embedding voice speaks every signifier we hear—while announcing the presence of an external voice. The signs that indicate indirect discourse can thus be read as invitations to readers and listeners to ask, word by word, whether the speaker's signifiers represent signifiers spoken by an external voice or ideas that the speaker thinks the external voice expressed.[14]

13. In the large-scale examples of double coding with "windows" that I analyze in this essay, the external speech act is a fictional entity and is made in the represented world. Ambiguity about which voice is represented in an embedded section in a doubly coded form is by no means restricted to fiction, however, but obtains whenever other sources of information are unavailable. I follow Ryan, who perceives that fictional texts each refer to a world of their own and cannot be validated externally because other texts do not share their reference world. Nonfiction texts, on the other hand, "offer versions of the same reality" and can be validated by information in other texts that refer to the same reality: "The reader evaluates the truth value of the [nonfiction] text by comparing its assertions to another source of knowledge relating to the same reference world" (Ryan 1997: 166).

14. Although free indirect discourse (FID) is generally considered the paradigmatic case of bivocality, I have selected indirect discourse (ID) as my local-level example of the relation between voices in larger-scale doubly coded forms for three reasons. First, ID represents two voices in a form in which it is often difficult to ascertain from word to word which speaker's choice a given signifier represents. In an article in which he analyzes accounts of FID, Brian McHale (1978: 259) discerns not three but seven categories of speech presentation, two of which he sees as types of ID: one ("Indirect content-paraphrase") that "corresponds to the

Thus far I have based my argument for the necessity of a "window" between embedded and embedding sections on the definition of the form I am analyzing: a form of representation that can be represented only through double coding cannot stand independently. Analysis of indirect discourse as a "window," however, suggests that the source of the power that "windows" sometimes have to enable representation of new forms is the presence in concept—but without means of expression—of a voice other than the embedding voice.

Indirect discourse exemplifies an extreme form of hierarchical relation between two voices: a subordination of the external to the embedding voice in which the material form of the representation (i.e., in indirect discourse, the signifiers) is overtly under the control of the embedding voice. In the embedded section, this situation in which an embedding voice speaks but says it is quoting another voice is the reason for the ambiguity from word to word about which voice's concepts readers and listeners are hearing. In addition, the embedding voice's control of the material form (here, again, the signifiers) of the embedded section tends to blur the line between the embedded and embedding sections. On the one side of the line (the embedding section) the embedding voice speaks, and on the other side of the line (the embedded section) the embedding voice speaks but says it is quoting another voice. Since the embedding voice speaks throughout, the location of the line cannot be determined as precisely as when indicated by quotation marks.

A "window," as I am using the term, encompasses both (1) the physical traces or signs of this extreme subordination of external to embedding voice—signs that are left in accordance with a governing semiotic system

common characterization of ID as the paraphrase of the content of a speech event, without regard to the style or form of the supposed 'original' utterance"; and another ("Indirect discourse, mimetic to some degree") that "gives the illusion of 'preserving' or 'reproducing' aspects of the style of an utterance, above and beyond the mere report of its content" (also cited by Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 109–10). In other words, ID includes paraphrase of a style and the illusion of reproducing a style—usually without indications that permit determining which is which. It is this situation I am calling word-by-word ambiguity. Second, ID leaves physical traces that indicate the subordination of the external voice to the embedding voice, but FID is sometimes invisible. As McHale (1978: 264) explains, FID can function only where "the intrusion of some voice other than (together with) the narrator's . . . can be recognized by the reader [whereas] the basic grammatical characteristics of FID . . . do not by themselves guarantee its being unequivocally distinguished from neutral (diegetic) narration in which only the narrator's voice is present." Third, FID is sometimes understood not as a representation of two voices but as a representation of one voice and another's (e.g., a character's) unverbalized thoughts and perceptions (but see Cohn 1978: 13–14, 99–116, esp. 109; and Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 110–11). Doubly coded forms include by definition two expressions, two voices' speech acts.

and that undermine the independent status of an external voice's speech act; and (2) the interpretations these signs elicit: in the embedded section, ambiguity about which voice is being heard; between the embedded and embedding sections, ambiguity about where the line is between the embedding voice speaking alone and the embedding voice quoting another voice. In section three of this essay, I will explore the semiotic systems that indicate the subordination of voice to voice in several media, and then in a concluding section I will return to the relation between, on the one hand, the extreme subordination of voice to voice and, on the other hand, the power of double coding to represent—and perceivers to envision—new forms of representation.

In the case of larger-scale doubly coded forms, I am not claiming that wherever there is a "window"—wherever the line between the embedded and the embedding sections is blurred and the embedding voice controls the material form of the external voice's expression—there will in every case be a representation of a new form of representation. Too many examples argue otherwise. But as I turn again to the examples I discussed earlier of doubly coded forms that represent new forms and add one further example, I will now assume that all examples of double coding that enable representation of new forms of representation will be "windows."

Thus far, to analyze the relations between voices in "windows," I have followed Ryan's example in taking indirect discourse as a pattern. Large-scale doubly coded forms may differ from indirect discourse, however, in two ways that need to be mentioned. First, in indirect discourse, the medium of all three elements is the same. If large-scale forms are to exhibit the blurring of the line between the embedded and the embedding sections that is characteristic of "windows," these sections will need to be in the same medium. But the medium of the external element can be any that can be imagined and may even be unspecified. Second, the signs that indicate the subordination of voice to voice differ from medium to medium and from the local level of indirect discourse to large-scale forms. But whenever double coding enables new forms, I shall argue, the subordinating effect of the embedding voice on the external voice will be indicated by the conventions of a governing semiotic system. Like indirect discourse, these conventions too leave physical traces that undermine the formal independence of the embedded section, blur the location of the line between embedded and embedding sections, and introduce ambiguity in the embedded section about which voice is represented moment by moment or brushstroke by brushstroke.

3.

James McNeill Whistler's *Caprice in Purple and Gold: The Golden Screen* (Figure 1), painted in 1864, is the work that initially led me to contemplate how it was sometimes possible to represent through double coding an art form that could not otherwise be represented at the time. My attention is drawn in this instance not so much to the background, where several panels of the Japanese screen to which the subtitle refers are depicted, but to the small artworks that the figure in the foreground is examining, one of which she holds in her left hand, at the very center of the painting. When I first saw Whistler's *Caprice* in the Freer Gallery in Washington, D.C., these small artworks seemed familiar; I thought I had seen paintings like them previously. Then I realized that I was interpreting them as representations of abstract expressionist paintings from the 1950s, by Richard Diebenkorn perhaps or by Philip Guston during his middle period, when he painted abstractions. Seeing these serene little Diebenkorns or Gustons in the setting in which Whistler places them—the typically nineteenth-century Orientalist, even *décadent* scene, with its exoticism that now looks so dated—was astonishing.

In contrast to my somewhat fanciful interpretation, art historians explain the scene as homogeneous. According to Julia Meech-Pakarik (1984: 95), the painting "attests to [Whistler's] fascination with Japanese art: he included a screen, a kimono, and a set of what appear to be single-sheet prints by Ando Hiroshige," the famous Japanese printmaker who lived from 1797 to 1858.[15] My reading is obviously ahistorical, and I do not insist upon it. Nor am I suggesting that Whistler could possibly have foreseen my reading.[16] My aim is to investigate the circumstances in which artworks

15. To establish Whistler's familiarity with Japanese prints, Meech-Pakarik (1984: 93) cites a study by Deborah Johnson (1982: 343), according to whom "Japanese prints . . . were dispersed throughout Europe, in France, England, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and generally available for viewing at least by 1840."

16. I do, however, see Whistler as at the forefront in his time of an inexorable move toward nonrepresentational art. Among the paintings he titled *Nocturne*, for instance, there are some so devoted to color and devoid of recognizable shapes that one can wonder whether the painter adopted the title to indicate that he hoped to emulate musical representations of night, or even to emulate music's power to be expressive without recourse to specific representation. We do know that, when Whistler was in Paris, he attended the famous *mardi* gatherings at the home of Stéphane Mallarmé, where he must have heard the poet talk, as he often did, of his desire that poetry might attain the nonrepresentational status of instrumental music.

The relation between the art forms represented through double coding and art forms available at the time when the doubly coded works were made varies from example to example among the four I am considering. Although Whistler and some of his contemporaries were undoubtedly thinking about whether and how the visual and verbal arts could become more like music, Whistler cannot in the 1860s have conceived and tried to emulate mid-twentieth-century abstract expressionist paintings. When Wilde was writing, on the other hand, experiments in recording stages in a process visually had already begun, including the stop-action

Figure 1 *Caprice in Purple and Gold: The Golden Screen* (1864), by James McNeill Whistler (1834–1903); oil on wood panel, 50.2 × 68.7 cm.; Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC (F1904.75). Gift of Charles Lang Freer.

represented through double coding can even fancifully be interpreted as diversely as, on the one hand, mid-twentieth-century oil paintings from the United States and, on the other hand, nineteenth-century Japanese woodblock prints.

First, since the medium of an embedded section need not be the same as the medium of the external element, the medium of the latter may remain unspecified—as it is in Whistler's *Caprice*. The medium of Whistler's painting—both the embedded section (the representation of the small artworks) and the embedding section (the scene of the woman examining the small artworks)—is oil paint on wood panel. Whether the external element is a woodblock print on paper or an oil painting on canvas, viewers of Whistler's painting *see* oil paint. My perhaps naive interpretation that Whistler's

photography by Eadweard Muybridge (1830–1904). Whatever Wilde himself may have imagined, among his contemporaries the idea of moving pictures was no longer inconceivable. By the time of Cortázar, moving pictures and photographs are equally available; his choice forces readers—including Antonioni—to reevaluate the one primary difference between the two media. *The Truman Show* openly explores the ethically questionable but commercially tremendously successful potential of an already foreseeable television genre.

depicted woman is looking at oil paintings is guided in part by the circumstance that the medium of the representation is oil paint.[17]

My initial reading of Whistler's painting exemplifies one aspect of the power of double coding to represent new forms of representation: that doubly coded forms can represent an external speech act without specifying its medium. Moreover, in response to any doubly coded form in which the medium of the embedded and the embedding sections is the same, perceivers who contemplate the issue will wonder whether the medium of the embedded section is determined by the medium of the external element (which it represents) or by the medium of the embedding section (which contains it). This ambiguity about the semiotic value of the medium of an embedded section is one aspect of the difficulty of determining which voice—external or embedding—is dominant in a given embedded section.

Whenever the medium of embedded and embedding sections is oil paint, the material form of the representation in the embedded section is entirely under the control of the embedding voice. Just as in indirect discourse, where all the signifiers are overtly spoken by the embedding voice, in Whistler's painting the embedding voice—the hand that wields the brush in the embedding section—also wields the brush in the embedded section. If we examine the painting (the painting itself, rather than a reproduction), we see that the brush strokes in the small artworks resemble those in the surrounding scene certainly more than they look like the surface of a woodblock print or, for that matter, like Diebenkorn's or Guston's brush strokes.

Looking at the embedded section, most viewers will probably interpret the embedding voice as dominant but also will recognize the influence of an external voice. The embedded differs from the embedding section in ways that reflect the influence of the external voice: the limited number of colors, the pervasive blue, and the avoidance of representational detail (all of which can be interpreted as reflecting characteristics of Japanese woodblock prints as well as abstract expressionist paintings). The mingling of the two voices in the small paintings and the resultant ambiguity about which voice we are "hearing" brush stroke by brush stroke is similar to the nearly word-by-word ambiguity about voice in indirect discourse.

Ambiguity in an embedded section about which voice is being heard is an effect of traces of the subordination of voice to voice. In indirect discourse, as I stressed in section two, this subordination is indicated by physical traces that undermine the formal independence of the embedded section—literally, the embedded portion of the sentence is made subordi-

17. Returning to the painting on another occasion, I recognized that the light depicted in the painting is focused on the small paintings, which shine with a brilliance that an artist using oil paint can achieve and that the ink used in Japanese woodblock prints cannot convey.

nate to the principal verb. A similar subordination is indicated in Whistler's painting according to the conventions of perspective.

Perspective is a semiotic system that permits visual representation of three-dimensional objects on a two-dimensional plane. In Whistler's painting, although we can see where the small artworks and the embedding situation meet, the small artworks are painted to look like rectangles but are not painted *as* rectangles. The representation of the small artworks alters them according to the rules of perspective, with the result that the lines on opposite sides of each of the small pieces are neither equidistant nor equal in length. If the small artworks were cut out and removed, they would no longer look like rectangles; they could not stand independently as complete paintings. The formal independence of the embedded section is subverted.

Perspective also blurs the border between embedded and embedding sections. Because the small paintings are not rectangles but represent rectangles, there is ambiguity about whether the line between the embedded and embedding sections is the painted line or the line that the painted line represents. In sum, Whistler's painting demonstrates the characteristics of a "window": the embedded and embedding sections have the same medium; the embedding voice controls the material form of the representation; a semiotic system—in this case, perspective—leaves traces that indicate the subordination of voice to voice, that undermine the independence of the embedded section, and that blur the border between the embedded and embedding sections.

In addition, the characteristic ambiguity that is an effect of the formal features of "windows" leaves perceivers to determine the line between the embedding section, where Whistler paints in his own name, and the embedded section, where Whistler (re)paints an external artist's artwork; and—in the embedded section—which colors and shapes and brush strokes to ascribe to Whistler's and which to an external artist's voice. This means that perceivers decide for themselves where the borders are around the area they ascribe only to Whistler, to which they then refer for comparison—as a touchstone, to establish Whistler's style—when trying to determine which elements in the embedded section are sufficiently different to be ascribed to an external voice. This also means that perceivers make these decisions—as well as the decision about the external artist's medium—on the basis of something other than the data the painting itself provides.

This set of interpretive decisions that all perceivers must make is sufficient, I think, to explain why I can see the small artworks in Whistler's painting—fancifully, I grant—as Diebenkorns or Gustons. In the final section of this essay I will take up the further issue of why one perceiver will see Gustons and Diebenkorns, while another, equally competent perceiver

will see other artists' work and even other media. But first I want to look again at *The Truman Show*, *Dorian Gray*, and "Blow-Up" in relation to the form and the effects characteristic of "windows."

In *The Truman Show*, the televised story of Truman's life is the external element. The representation of the television show in the movie is the embedded section. The embedding section is the representation of Christof's world—which includes Truman himself and the events of his life, both during the thirty years of the televised *The Truman Show* and after. While Truman finds a "gate" through which he escapes from the television show to Christof's world, viewers look through a "window" from Christof's world to the television show. As we have seen, a "window" entails that embedded and embedding sections have the same medium, which these do, and that the subordination of the external to the embedding voice be indicated according to the conventions of a semiotic system appropriate to the medium. In the first section of this essay we saw the effect of the placement of the expositional material in shaping the embedding narrative. Now we recognize the existence of expositional material as a trace of the subordination of the external voice (the television show, which is Christof's speech act) to the embedding voice (the voice of the movie—expressed, among other ways, through the editing process).

Narrative, like perspective, is a semiotic system; it has its own set of conventions for subordinating some material to other material. Overt treatment as exposition is a conventional means of subordinating a material, and it leaves traces on the subordinated material. One trace is placement: expositional material is conveyed after the fact, rather than in the "now" of an ongoing account. A second trace is shape: expositional material is usually summarized—shortened and compressed, to be reported in fewer words or, in the case of film, less time than full scenic treatment requires. Just as in indirect discourse we read shifts in verb tenses, deictics, and pronouns as traces of a mediating voice, so we read summaries and retrospective placement of overt expositional material as traces of a mediating voice in narrative.

In *The Truman Show*, the compression, omission, and reordering of segments of a real-time television show, for which I gave examples in the first section of this essay, are traces of the subordination of the external to the embedding voice. Because of the compressing and the reordering, even if there were indications of a line along which to cut, the embedding section could not stand independently as a representation of a real-time representation of a life, which is the distinguishing feature of the televised *The Truman Show*. This subordination of voice to voice in a "window" has the effects

we now expect: the external and the embedding voices intermingle in the embedded section, and the line between the embedded and the embedding sections is blurred.

In the embedded section, the external and the embedding voice can both be heard in each of the two types of material I distinguished earlier in this essay: the real-time scenes and the summaries. In the summaries we hear the subordinating traces of the embedding voice's mediation, along with some of the contents of the external voice's television show. In the real-time scenes that represent Truman's life (until Truman escapes from the television show in the last minutes of the movie), we cannot distinguish between the two voices we hear simultaneously: the external voice (these scenes look like scenes in the television show) and the embedding voice, which reports these scenes. This bivocality in the real-time scenes permits viewers to interpret any scenic treatment of Truman (until the concluding section) as the speech of the external voice, or of the embedding voice, or of both.

In addition, because Truman's life as the protagonist of a television show—along with his departure from the show—is part of the story that the embedding section recounts, all representations of Truman's life on the show, whether real-time or summarized, are elements of both the embedded section and the embedding section, effectively blurring the line between the two. The ambiguity this creates for viewers about whether the focus of the movie at given moments is on Christof's world or on the televised *The Truman Show* is heightened by the quantity of the material that can be interpreted as an element in either section or both. The fact that viewers can interpret every scene that depicts Truman's life on the show as an element of either section is largely the effect of the ontological boundary that the film erects and then subverts. Truman is both a character in the embedded television show in which he stars and a person who exists in the supporting actors' and Christof's world. But medium is also an aspect of the complexity of the experience that the movie offers viewers.

Nelson Goodman (1978: 48) distinguishes between paintings, which belong to what he calls "a *singular* symbol system," and photography, which, because of the "relation among the several prints from a negative," can be considered "a multiple symbol system [with its] symbols having plural instances" (Goodman's italics). The "relation among the several prints from a negative"—the identity of copy to copy, in film as in photography—is the reason that depictions of Truman in the embedded section and in the embedding section—whether scenes or summaries—look exactly alike. This identity of copy to copy is the source of the ambiguity for viewers about whether from moment to moment they are viewing an element of the embedded or of the embedding section.

In *The Truman Show*, moreover, the medium of the embedded and the embedding sections is film—and so too is the medium of the external element (the televised *The Truman Show*). The effect of this tripling of medium, when the medium is film, is that real-time representations of Truman's life (until the television transmission is cut off) can not only be interpreted as segments of the embedded or the embedding sections; they also share an identity of copy to copy with the television show they are representing. As we saw in the first section of this essay, real-time representations of Truman in the movie, until he escapes to Christof's world, are visually identical to moments in the television show. This is why the television show and the version of it that is embedded in the movie can be distinguished by viewers only through the formal characteristics of narrative. Viewers of *The Truman Show* do of course know they are seeing a movie, even if they are playing a video of it on a television set with a VCR. But if at the beginning of the movie some viewers are able to suspend disbelief and for a few minutes experience watching a new television form, we can now understand that their experience is brought about by the placement at the beginning of the movie of signs that indicate television, by the tripling of medium that occurs when the medium of the external speech act is the same as the medium of the embedded and embedding sections, and by the characteristic iterability of the medium of film.

If *The Truman Show* offers a nearly transparent representation of a few minutes of a form that cannot be represented in its entirety mainly because of its duration (in addition to legal and ethical concerns), the small artworks in Whistler's painting are a more opaque representation, offering viewers greater interpretive freedom. The difference in viewers' experience is, at least in part, the result of differences in the medium of the embedded section and in the relation between the medium of the embedded section and of the external speech act. In the movie, as we have seen, the external element and the embedded section are in the same medium, and that medium is a multiple symbol system in which copies can be considered plural instances of a negative. In Whistler's painting, the medium of the external element is either unspecified or extratextually specified, and the medium of the embedded section is oil paint, an example of Goodman's "singular symbol system"; viewers make no assumption of identity from copy to copy.

In considering Whistler's painting, we saw that when the medium of the external speech act is unspecified, the medium of the embedded section may be perceived as an ambiguous sign; it may be interpreted as determined by and duplicating either the medium of the embedding section or

the medium of the external element. This ambiguity is heightened if viewers who wonder about the medium of the external element also wonder how closely—or how distantly—the representation resembles the external voice's speech act. The combination in Whistler's painting in which the medium of the external element is unspecified, and the medium in which it is represented in the embedded section is painting, offers viewers a relatively open interpretive situation. Because viewers of the painting must establish for themselves what they think the external element looks like, the painting offers viewers an additional level of decision making that exceeds the hermeneutic activity that all artworks—including the painting and the movie—elicit. The differences in the choice and treatment of medium would seem to underlie both the interpretive freedom that Whistler's painting offers and the opportunity that *The Truman Show* gives viewers to experience an art form that is otherwise as yet unavailable.

In Wilde's *Dorian Gray* and Cortázar's "Blow-Up," the medium of the external element is specified (an oil painting in the novel, a photograph in the story); but ekphrasis—the re-representation in words of a visual representation—requires readers to make many of the same kinds of decisions about what the re-represented visual artwork looks like that a painted re-representation (or a re-representation in any visual medium with a multiple symbol system) requires. Any re-representation of a visual depiction is affected by what Roland Barthes (1977 [1964]: 38–39) sees as the "polysemous" nature of the image: "all images . . . imply, underlying their signifiers, a 'floating chain' of signifieds, the reader able to choose some and ignore others." Summarizing and developing studies by Michel Foucault and others, in addition to Barthes and Goodman, Donald P. Spence (1982) argues convincingly that what one sees—what elements one recognizes—when one looks at a visual scene depends on how one partitions the scene into units and which units draw attention.[18] How writers, as well as painters, re-represent a visual artwork depends on what they see when they look at it as well as on what they select and are able to represent. In a doubly coded form, when an embedded section represents a visual artwork, whether in a visual medium or in words, viewers and readers appropriately interpret the embedded representation as one among other possible versions, ascribing

18. Spence (1982: 56) also contends, I think accurately, that naming units alters what one sees, that a description of a visual scene is never complete, and, finally, that the words that translate a visually stored memory "invariably misrepresent the image . . . and . . . tend to replace [it]." Spence's analysis of the reinterpretation of events in, and as a result of, the narratives communicated between analyst and analysand in psychoanalysis has interesting implications for studies of ekphrasis.

variation at least as much to the embedding voice's eye that sees as to the individual style of the hand that wields the brush or writes.

In narratives, furthermore, focalization can undercut the authority of an embedding voice's ekphrastic description. In *Dorian Gray*, information about what the portrait looks like is presented almost entirely in the narrator's words but is focalized through a character. In chapter 7, when the idea that the painting is changing is introduced, readers are shown Dorian's perceptions and conceptions when he notices that the portrait seems different, compares it with his own face, and concludes that the resemblance is no longer exact. But this scene takes place just after daybreak, at the end of a night that Dorian has spent wandering throughout the city after having broken off his relationship with Sibyl Vane. For readers who may decide that it is more likely that Dorian is overwrought than that the portrait has altered, confirmation of Dorian's vision through the eyes of another character is withheld for nearly two decades of story time and several score pages. The painting is locked away where only Dorian can see it until, in chapter 13, he shows it to Basil Hallward, who painted it but now recognizes it as his own work only after he examines the brushwork and the frame, which he had designed.

Cortázar's story, even more pointedly, begins with an apostrophe asking how it is to be told, with what pronoun, whether singular or plural. The voice that speaks says "we" or "I" or "he" alternately—where "he" is Roberto Michel and both "he" and "I" (and perhaps "we") refer to a character in the fictional world who is translating into French a treatise by José Norberto Allende and who leaves his Paris apartment to take photographs on Sunday morning, 7 November. Readers may assume that they are reading an autobiography of a Roberto Michel whose sense of self is shattered and fragmentary or an account of the activities of a Roberto Michel that is being told first through one focalization and then another. According to either interpretation, readers view the scene depicted in the enlarged photograph through a focalization that is a multiple and prismatic—rather than a unitary—lens.

In addition, in both narratives, a focalizer narrativizes a visually represented scene, thereby supplying information that the representation does not depict. In *Dorian Gray*, in chapter 7, immediately after Dorian concludes that the painted figure's face really has changed—and his own face has not—he sits down to think. Then, we are told, Dorian suddenly remembers the scene on the day the portrait had been finished, when he had expressed the wish that not he but the portrait might grow old. And on the very next page, as soon as Dorian has established a prior and possibly causal event, he begins to think about the outcome: how the portrait will look in the future.

Foreseeing that it will lose its beauty, he pities it and then decides to behave in a manner that will protect it. He will resist temptation, make amends to Sybil Vane, and marry her.

Cortázar's story begins at a moment when the focalizer sees clouds, and occasionally a pigeon, flitting across the enlarged photograph on his apartment wall. The story thus treats everything that leads up to this scene as expositional material, as an explanation of how this photograph across which birds flit has come about. But in addition, in the scene where the photographer first sees the couple he is about to photograph, he speculates about how the boy and the woman have happened to meet, who they are, and what their relationship is. The photographer then thinks about what will happen next, whether the boy will run away from the woman or leave with her. When he takes the photograph, the boy runs off; the photographer thinks he has saved him. Later, after the photograph has been developed and enlarged, the focalizer who is looking at it interprets the event he thinks he sees happening there and tries to act to change the outcome. In "Blow-Up," as in *Dorian Gray*, the focalizer responds to a visual representation (and in the case of the photographer, a scene in his world too) by supplying events that are subsequent or prior to the depicted event to make a story.[19]

Like perspective in Whistler's painting and narrative in *The Truman Show*, ekphrasis is a semiotic system that subordinates voice to voice and leaves physical traces of the subordination: the substitution of words for an image. In doubly coded forms in which a visually depicted external element is represented in the embedded section through ekphrasis, the embedding voice's words provide for readers (no more than) a "window" through which to glimpse elements of the external voice's artwork. In the embedded section, the embedding and the external voices mingle to a degree that readers cannot know how much of the external voice's visual representation they are "hearing." The line between the embedded section and the embedding section is blurred because the embedding voice "speaks" on both sides of the line.

When ekphrasis also includes narrativizing a visually depicted static scene, the embedding voice not only controls the material form of the

19. Shimon Sandbank (1994), who analyzes lyric poems inspired by visual artworks, demonstrates that the preponderance of information in ekphrastic poems is information that the visual artwork does not depict. Tracing diachronically instances of narrativizing in ekphrastic literature, James A. W. Heffernan (1991: 306) perceives that even John Keats's famous paean to stasis reports "what *will* happen in the absence of change. In other words [Keats] tells a *story* of changelessness" (Heffernan's italics). Yacobi (1995: 612–13) cites Lessing to demonstrate that already in the *Laocoön* (1766) he recognized that—because the poet can describe what precedes and follows a depicted isolated moment—the poet can include elements that the visual depiction does not.

representation and determines which elements of the polysemous image to report, but also interprets the image as the (possible) effect of prior events and the (possible) cause of events yet to occur. The embedding voice constructs a causally ordered sequence: a story. The addition of previous and/or subsequent scenes expands the embedded section so that it cannot stand as a representation of a single-scene external element. And narrativizing also makes the line between the embedded and the embedding section difficult to discern, because the line is no longer drawn between a static scene and a framing narrative, but rather between two parallel and interrelated narratives.[20]

Moreover, when Cortázar's photographer, while he is watching the couple whom he is about to photograph, speculates about how they met, what each of them wants, and whether they will leave together, he is constructing a story that has not previously been told. When Dorian looks at the portrait that has begun to change and interprets its appearance by constructing a causal sequence—remembering his wish that the portrait would age but he would not, then planning to be good so that the portrait will remain beautiful—he is not just representing verbally a prior visual representation; he is constructing a new story that has not previously been told.

Using double coding to tell a story that has not previously been told is not the same thing as using double coding to represent a new form of representation. Nonetheless, if Dorian, Cortázar's focalizer, and many viewers of representational paintings interpret visually depicted scenes as one among other events in a story, our common experience[21] is only one imaginative leap away from envisioning that the story plays itself out *in* the visually depicted world. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that the new forms of representation that Wilde's novel and Cortázar's story represent through ekphrasis are visual representations that begin to move.

20. In the best detailed analysis I have read of the integration of ekphrasis into plot (in this case, in Isak Dinesen's narratives), Yacobi (1995: 640) finds that examples of ekphrasis are often located at "central plot junctures. They may heighten or complicate our expectations at the outset, . . . they may lay bare the threat to and below the apparent stasis of the end. . . . In terms of the ongoing action . . . the change of pictorial models attends and reflects the hero's moment of discovery (anagnorisis), which in turn rechannels the subsequent flow of the plot."

21. In previous work (Kafalenos 1996 and 2001), I argue that perceivers commonly respond to a visual depiction of an isolated moment, as long as some trace of human or anthropomorphic concerns can be discerned, by remembering or making stories that include the depicted scene.

4.

In an important study of the variety of forms subsumed under the term *ekphrasis*, Tamar Yacobi (1995, 1997) introduces a category of ekphrasis that is common in practice but, as she discerns, previously overlooked in theory and commentary: ekphrasis that represents a "pictorial (stereo)type" or "model," as opposed to a "unique" (specific, single) artwork. A "model" (Yacobi's preferred terminology) or "type" is a concept—a composite imagined by perceivers—of the identifying characteristics of visual artworks that share either a thematics (a Madonna with child, Zeus approaching Leda, an odalisque) or a style (a Turner seascape, a Rodin marble, a Francis Bacon humanoid). It is the latter—the stylistic model or type—that I want to distinguish from the unique in relation to double coding. I will adopt the term *type* for the composite and speak of artworks—all artworks, not just visual representations—as either a type or unique.[22]

Returning to the four examples of "windows" I have been discussing, I want to consider the external artwork represented in each in relation to this distinction between the unique and a type, along with two additional parameters: whether the artwork is located in the represented world and/or our world (which Yacobi also considers in relation to ekphrasis) and what the artwork's temporal position is in relation to the represented world and/or our world. In these relations, the four works show interesting similarities. When perceived from within the narrative world, the external element is seen in all four examples as unique and as existing in and contemporaneous to the narrative world. It is only in our world that the external element can be thought of as a type and as impossible to represent at a given time except through double coding.

In *Dorian Grey*, which is told more or less in chronological sequence, the

22. Compare Yacobi's term "type" (a Turner seascape, an impressionist painting, a baroque cathedral), reconceived as including other art forms (a Chopin nocturne, an Italian opera, an Alfred Hitchcock film, a Jane Austen novel, a detective story, an imagist poem), to Wayne Booth's (1961: 70–71) term "implied author," as defined by Seymour Chatman (1978: 148), according to whom "'implied' [means] reconstructed by the reader from the narrative"; as expanded by Booth (1979: 270) himself, who introduces the term "career-author" to name "the sum of the invented creators implied by all of the writer's particular works"; and, finally, as expanded to include artists working in all media. Both terms, thus defined, offer a theoretical tool to explore which elements individuals and groups of individuals find distinctive (notice, pay attention to) in the work of a given painter, filmmaker, writer, etc.; where variation occurs among the composites that perceivers construct; and for which artists or art forms the composites that perceivers make vary or coincide most thoroughly. Although I call attention to two useful approaches to establishing and defining a field that I think invites transmedia analysis, I choose Yacobi's term "type" because it includes composites that represent periods and genres as well as composites of individual artists' productions.

duration of the picture's existence is almost identical to the duration of the reported events. The picture is completed shortly after the novel begins and is destroyed just before the novel ends. Although the other two narratives, Cortázar's "Blow-Up" and *The Truman Show*, are told largely retrospectively, the origins of the artwork in both—the taking and enlarging of the photograph in "Blow-Up" and the prebirth segments of the televised *The Truman Show*—are included in the expositional material. Even Whistler's painting, which cannot represent temporal relations with the specificity of narrative, indicates that the small artworks are newly introduced into the setting in which we see them, where they are depicted not only as the object of attention but also as an almost disorderly heap in a scene in which otherwise every fold of every cloth is artfully arranged.

The contemporaneity of the external element to the embedding situation in my four examples enhances the uniqueness in the represented world of each. The woman in Whistler's painting seems to have placed the small artworks in front of her in order to compare them, to see which one she prefers or how they differ. The attention she is giving the one she is holding suggests that she sees that one and each of the others as unique rather than as the types that we turn them into when we call them little Gustons, or Diebenkorns, or Hiroshige prints. In the three narratives, additionally, there is a personal element. Dorian faces a portrait of himself; it is *his* image that begins to change. Cortázar's photographer watches a photograph that he himself has taken begin to move. The viewers of the televised *The Truman Show* seem to feel a personal attachment to Truman, whom they have known all his life. Even Whistler's depicted woman has brought the small artworks into a place that is hers.

In all four cases, the artwork fascinates its viewers in the represented world. Dorian studies his portrait and thinks about the effect on the portrait of his every act. Cortázar's photographer is so obsessed with the photograph that he seems unable to think about anything else. Whistler's woman gives her full attention to the small artwork she holds. The audiences we see watching the televised *The Truman Show*, whether at home, showing their emotion by jumping up and down with excitement and hugging each other, or standing in a crowded bar and cheering, are intently gazing at the television screen.

Like many other examples of double coding, these four use the rapt attention of a personified narratee, a perceiver in the represented world, to guide and hold the attention of perceivers in our world.[23] In effect, through the

23. William Nelles (1997: 143) suggests, correctly I think, that "the doubling of the communication paradigm through embedding marks out three sites of latent or potential significance,

expression of their own interest, the viewers in the represented world say to perceivers in our world "Look—look at this embedded artwork that I think is worth your attention." This possibility of portraying a character's response as a model for perceivers in our world to emulate is undoubtedly one of the reasons why artists (writers, painters, etc.) use double coding as often as they do. Another aspect of the form that artists must surely find attractive is that, when the medium of the external element is different from the medium of the embedded section, the artist is able to draw upon the expressive possibilities of a medium in which she or he may have no technical proficiency. Without being able to paint, a writer can represent a specific filtered light by embedding a Turner seascape through ekphrasis either as unique or as a type. A painter can represent the pattern or the heft of a spectacular textile by painting it without being able to weave.

But doubly coded forms that are "windows" offer another and perhaps more subtle attraction to the artist who makes them. In the embedded section of a "window," where the external and the embedding voices mingle, the material form of the representation is nominally under the control of the embedding voice—and literally under the control of the painter, the filmmaker, or the writer. In the embedding section, it is as if a duet were being sung by one voice. For visual artists directly, and for writers at one remove (through a narrator or persona), making a doubly coded "window" would seem to resemble putting on a mask or playing a role on stage: the opportunity to speak or embody a creative, world-making voice other than one's own.

The effect is that artists can embed an artwork without being held entirely responsible for it. When Peter Weir makes a movie that embeds a television show in which a human being is imprisoned, he does not earn the reputation of a director who imprisons the actors in his films. Whistler can paint small artworks that are less detailed than his paintings typically are, without leading nineteenth-century viewers to think of him as a painter who experiments with abstraction. Wilde and Cortázar are considered imaginative writers, not people who believe that figures in paintings and photographs move. For all four, and anyone else who makes a doubly coded "window," the form grants permission to make something without being thought of as having "authored" it. The form permits the embedding voice to speak without appending a signature (Whistler, the small paintings) or to speak and sign a character's name (Christof, Basil Hallward, Roberto Michel). This

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any (or all) of which might be foregrounded by a given narrative context: the two stories, two narrators, and two narratees all offer topoi for comparative analysis. All three components enable the author to more closely direct interpretation."

freedom from responsibility for what one has made is undoubtedly part of the power of double coding to represent new forms of representation.

But a new form of representation that cannot be manifest except through double coding is a conceptual entity—in fact, a type, constructed by perceivers in response to the representation offered by the artist. Consequently, whether a given example of double coding with a "window" has the power to represent a new form of representation is determined finally by whether viewers, readers, or listeners make the requisite imaginative leap from a unique artwork represented through double coding to a type that can be conceived as existing independently in our world.

In the four examples I have been discussing, the unique artworks that are represented cannot exist in our world. The televised *The Truman Show* has a character named Truman as its protagonist. We will not see a real-time television show in which the Truman we have come to know is the protagonist, but if we conceive the show as a type—as a real-time representation of some person's life—we are then free to consider the strong possibility that such a show will soon become available. Similarly, computers can be programmed to show us the changes in a person's face during the process of aging, but they cannot show us how Dorian's portrait looks from year to year. Other computer programs can remove selected images from photographs and add others, but they cannot replicate the specific photograph that Cortázar's focalizer sees. We can look at mid-twentieth-century abstract expressionist paintings, but none that received proleptic representation in Whistler's *Caprice*.

All doubly coded forms invite questions of interpretation about the relations between the embedding and the embedded sections—questions beyond those that either section might raise if perceived separately. But in "windows," the mingling of voices in the embedded section and the blurring of the line between the embedded and the embedding sections require perceivers to make decisions about where the embedding voice speaks alone and about which elements on the embedded side of the border differ sufficiently from those on the embedding side to be ascribed to the external voice. In other words, perceivers of "windows" construct two stylistic types: the embedding voice's style and the external voice's style—and they do this without being able to determine exactly which elements the embedding voice speaks and without access to any segment where the external voice speaks alone.

That is, perceivers make decisions about (1) which elements of a "window" to ascribe to the embedding voice; (2) which additional elements (from artworks one knows and deems pertinent) to include when construct-

ing for the embedding voice a type; (3) which elements in the embedded section to ascribe to the external voice, whether because they do not conform to one's construct of the embedding voice's style and/or because one decides they are shared by both voices; and (4) in addition to those nonconforming and shared elements, which other elements (from artworks one knows and deems pertinent) to include in determining for the external voice a type. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that there is variation among the stylistic types that perceivers construct, particularly for the external voice, for which no unmediated example is available.

The historical period and the culture in which a perceiver lives, the artworks with which a perceiver is familiar, and a perceiver's aesthetic proclivities thus all come into play—to an uncommon degree—in the process of (re)constructing the external element represented through double coding in a "window" and are sufficient to explain why one perceiver may see a representation that anticipates a new art form where another sees a representation of an existing type or unique artwork. Moreover, for reasons these four works I have analyzed help us discern, examples of double coding that are "windows" provide a fertile area for further study of the way in which, in response to artworks in all media, we alternate our attention between, on the one hand, the composite type that a unique artwork guides us to establish and, on the other hand, the unique artwork that we can see only through the lens of the type—a lens that focuses our attention on certain elements in the artwork we are reading or viewing and that blinds us to others.

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